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RECENT CASE NOTES
DAMAGES-CERTAINTY OF AMOUNT OR EXTENT OF DAMAGE-LOSS OF PROFITS.
-Defendant, an established trucker, sold his equipment and good will to
plaintiff, an established competitor, and promised to assist him in retaining
defendant's former customers and employees. The court, finding that de-
fendant had broken his promise of assistance, awarded damages for lost
profits on evidence introduced showing the amount of defendant's business
before and after the transfer. The appeal alleged the damages were remote,
speculative, and conjectural. Held, Affirmed: If it is certain that there was
damage, the amount need not be proved with mathematical certainty, but it is
sufficient if there is evidence which will enable the court or jury to make a
fair and reasonable approximation. Hedrick et al. v. Perry (C. C. A. 10, 1939),
102 F. (2d) 802.
Originally, loss of profits was never an element of recoverable damage
either in actions of tort1 or contract. 2 This complete restriction has been
gradually eliminated. As early as 1845 a celebrated case allowed "profits"
when they were the direct result of the wrongful act.3 It is now repeatedly
asserted, beginning as early as 1858, that they may be recovered even when
they are consequential; i. e., based upon collateral transactions. 4  However,
recovery for alleged loss of profits is often denied.
Courts have advanced standards of certainty to which a claim for this
damage must conformi.5 It seems, however, that less stringent rules are
applied when the alleged loss is the direct result of the wrong. In such cases,
if a loss of some profit is proved with reasonable certainty, the amount may
be submitted to the jury on the best evidence which is available. 6
In regard to consequential damage as distinguished from direct, there is
confusion in the decisions but a definite trend toward liberality is apparent.
The first decisions required that both the fact of some damage and its amount
be certain.7 Later decisions have modified this to reasonable certainty.8
1 The requirement of certainty of lost profits is the same in both contract
and tort actions. See note (1933), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 696.
2The Anna Maria (1817), 15 U. S. (2 Wheat.) 327; The Amiable Nancy
(1818), 16 U. S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 4 L. Ed. 256; Boyd v. Brown (1835), 17
Pick. (Mass.) 453.
a Masterton v. Mayor, etc. of City of Brooklyn (1845), 7 Hill 61, 42 Am.
Dec. 38.
4 Griffin v. Colver (1858), 16 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718, admitting that
consequential damage can be recovered if it is certain. Occasionally, rental
value of property or interest on investment is allowed in lieu of damages
for loss of profit.
Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co. (1896), 56 Kan. 614, 44 Pac. 621.
5 Although the doctrine of certainty is occasionally used to test the suffi-
ciency of proof of claims for future consequences of personal injury or to claims
for direct physical loss or injury, its principal use is in the field of commercial
profits. McCormick, Damages (1935), Sec. 28. It is an anomaly in damage
law, used chiefly in American courts.6 Bagley v. Smith (1853), 10 N. Y. 489; Dennis v. Maxfield (1865), 92
Mass. 138; Shoemaker v. Ackler (1897), 116 Cal. 239, 48 Pac. 62; Rule v.
McGregor (1902), 117 Iowa 419, 90 N. W. 811.
7 Griffin v. Colver (1858), 16 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718; Winston Cigarette
Machine Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co. (1906), 141 N. C. 284, 53 S. E.
885.
8 Belcher v. Bullion (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), 121 S. W. (2d) 483; Steitz v.
Gifford (1939), 280 N. Y. 15, 19 N. E. (2d) 661; Restatement, Contracts
(1932), § 331.
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A number of modern decisions have stated that the requirement of certainty
applies only to the fact of some damage and not to its amount. 9 However,
many courts, purporting to apply this standard, actually do require a degree
of certainty of amount. The prevailing view still is that the amount must
be reasonably certain.1 0 Some courts have gone further in applying the above
rule and held that the amount can be measured by sufficient evidence to enable
the jury to make a fair and reasonable approximation"l or even with the
best evidence which is available under the circumstances.1 2
Indiana decisions demonstrate remarkable consistency. Originally, loss of
profits probably was not considered an element of recoverable damage.' 3 The
court subsequently adopted and has since retained a rule of "reasonable
certainty", making no distinction between the fact of some loss and its
amount, and requiring a criterion by which damages can be measured. 1 5
But regardless of the rule applied and, to some extent, regardless of the
evidence submitted to measure the loss,1 6 where an established business has
been destroyed or interrupted, the courts are lenient.17 Where a new business
has been destroyed, the courts deny recovery.' 8 Where an agency contract has
been broken, the courts with few exceptions allow recovery if the agency is
exclusive and deny it if it is not.1 9
9 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. (1931), 282 U. S.
555, 51 Sup. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544; Thayer-Moore Brokerage Co. r, Campbell
(1912), 164- Mo. App. 8, 147 S. W. 545; Hacker Pipe and Supply Co. v. Chip-
man Valve Mfg. Co. (1936), 17 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 61 Pac. (2d) 944; Nichols
v. Anderson (1939), 43 N. M. 296, 92 P. (2d) 781; Oliver v. Autographic
Register Co. (1939), 126 N. J. Eq. 18, 7 Atl. (2d) 797.
10 City of Corning v. Iowa-Nebraska Light and Power Co. (Iowa 1938),
282 N. W. 791.
11 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. (1931), 282 U. S.
555, 51 Sup. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544; City of Kennett v. Katz Construction Co.
(1918), 273 Mo. 279, 202 S. W. 558; Hacker Pipe and Supply Co. v. Chipman
Valve Mfg. Co. (1936), 17 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 61 Pac. (2d) 944.
12 Thayer-Moore Brokerage Co. v. Campbell (1912), 164 Mo. App. 8, 147
S. W. 545; Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Sheets (1936), 178 Okla. 191, 62
Pac. (2d) 91.
13 Porter v. Allen (1856), 8 Ind. 1.
14 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen (1882), 84 Ind. 347; Connersville Wagon
Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co. (1905), 166 Ind. 123, 76 N. B. 294; Doddridge
v. American Trust and Savings Bank (1934), 98 Ind. App. 334, 189 N. E. 165.
15 Montgomery Co. Union Agr. Soc. v. Harwood (1891), 126 Ind. 440, 26
N. E. 182; Cleveland, C., C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Woodbury Glass Co (1918),
80 Ind. App. 298, 120 N. E. 426.
16Ralph S. Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's
Liability (1933), 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 586.
17 City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut (1887), 112 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. 686;
Cleveland, C., C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Woodbury Glass Co. (1918), 80 Ind.
App. 298, 120 N. E. 426; Belcher v. Bullion (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), 121 S. W.
(2d) 483. But see: Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFarland Carriage Co.
(1905), 166 Ind. 123, 76 N. E. 294.
18 Western Gravel Road Co. v. Cox (1872), 39 Ind. 260; Montgomery Co.
Union Agr. Soc. v. Harwood (1890), 126 Ind. 440, 26 N. E. 182; Paola Gas
Co. v. Paola Glass Co. (1896), 56 Kan. 614, 44 Pac. 621; Texas Power and
Light Co. v. Roberts (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), 187 S. W. 225; American Oil Co.
v. Lovelace (1928), 150 Va. 624, 143 S. E. 293. Contra: Story Parchment Co v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co. (1931), 282 U. S. 555, 51 Sup. Ct. 248, 75
L. Ed. 544.
19McGinnis v. Studebaker Corp. of Am. (1915), 75 Oreg. 519, 146 Pac.
825, denied recovery in non-exclusive agency. Hirchhorn v. Bradley (1902),
238
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The tendency of the courts to refuse recovery when a new business is
destroyed seems to have caused them to refuse recovery where a business
opening has been delayed.2 0 If the litigation occurs subsequent to the delayed
opening, it appears that operating data would form a sufficiently certain
measure of the loss. 2 1
In those cases where the alleged loss is due to the prevention of one trans-
action as contrasted with the situation where a series of transactions is in-
volved, the majority view allows the whole profit if it is reasonably certain
that the plaintiff would have obtained it.22 A minority of American jurisdic-
tions have followed the English view and allow the claimant the value of
his chance, to be determined by the jury.2 3
Originally, a criterion for measurement was required for the recovery of
both direct and consequential losses. Fact situations involving a claim for
direct loss, just as they had been the first in which any recovery was allowed,
were the first in which the measurement of the damage was left to the
discretion of the jury. Recent decisions show greater leniency in the case
of consequential loss, even within the same jurisdiction.2 4 It is submitted that
the principal case, requiring evidence only for a reasonable approximation of
the amount of the consequential loss, is a step toward a desirable and
logical view. V. R. B.
DAMAGES-MENTAL SUFFERING.-Plaintiff, who was recovering from serious
illness, suffered a relapse when the defendant collection agency, knowing his
condition and intending to induce payment of a debt by intimidation, sent
letters threatening suit, attachment, garnishment, and the future credit stand-
ing of the plaintiff. Held: Plaintiff may recover for physical injuries resulting
from mental suffering intentionally caused by the defendant. Clark v. Asso-
dated Retail Credit Men (C. C. A. D. C., 1939), 105 F. (2d) 62.
Recovery for mental suffering is universally permitted when an individual
intentionally acts in such a way as to place another person in apprehension of
bodily harm or an offensive touching.1 Recovery is generally allowed when
an individual acts, intentionally or negligently, in such a way as to cause a
mental condition which influences another person to react toward his physical
surroundings in such a manner as to sustain physical injury,2 or to cause
117 Iowa 130, 90 N. V. 592; Wakeman v. Wheeler and Wilson Mfg. Co.
(1886), 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. 264; United States Auto Co. v. Arkadelphia
Milling Co. (1919), 140 Ark. 73, 215 S. W. 64-1; Long Beach Drug Co. v.
United Drug Co. (Cal. 1939), 89 Pac. (2d) 386, allowed recovery when ex-
clusive agency contract was broken. Contra: Stephany v. Hunt Bros. Co.
(1923), 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 Pac. 797.
20 Western Gravel Road Co. v. Cox (1872), 39 Ind. 260.
21 Note (1933), 46 Harv. L. Rev. 696.
22 Barker v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1908), 134 Wis. 147, 114 N.
NV. 439; Phillips v. Pantoges Theater Co. (1931), 163 Wash. 303, 300 Pac. 1048.
23 Chaplin v. Hicks (1911), 2 K. B. 786; Wachtel v. National Alfalfa
Journal Co. (1920), 190 Iowa 1293, 176 N. W. 801; Kansas City, Mex., and
Orient Railroad Co. v. Beel (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), 197 S. W. 322.
24As an example, the rule in New York has changed from certainty,
Griffin v. Colver (1858), 16 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718, to reasonable cer-
tainty, Steitz v. Gifford (1939), 280 N. Y. 15, 19 N. E. (2d) 661.
1 Note (1923), 23 A. L. R. 361, 389.
2 Woolery v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. (1886), 107 Ind. 381, 8 N. E.
226; Restatement, Torts (1934), Sec. 443, 444.
